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Forest plantations generate a number of favourable environmental and social benefits for the 
community, quite apart from the revenue from timber and other private benefits to growers. 
There has been much interest in whether the positive externalities of natural and plantation 
forestry – including carbon sequestration, salinity mitigation, biodiversity protection, and 
watershed and water quality protection – can be converted into market products for which 
forest owners receive payment. Various mechanisms for marketing ecosystem services have 
been trialled or suggested. Market-based instruments have advantages over subsidy and 
grant payments, but are not necessarily more socially efficient. Opportunities exist for 
marketing ecosystem services (particularly carbon credits). There are signs that these 
markets will develop in the future, providing the institutional framework is supportive. 
 
 
INTRODUCTION 
While some landholders are happy to plant trees for environmental objectives, others expect 
a positive financial return from their investment. Similarly, a target rate of return is sought by 
industrial foresters, e.g. anecdotal evidence suggests a rate of return of 7% is regarded as a 
satisfactory return for industrial forestry in Queensland. Sharp (2002) found that venture 
capital providers seek a return on forestry typically of the order of 12%. Financial analysis of 
forestry projects in north Queensland suggests that profitability is marginal if a discount rate 
of the order of 7% is adopted (Harrison et al. 2001) but non-market benefits can be 
substantial (Eono and Harrison 2002).  
 
The creation of markets mechanisms for rewarding growers for non-wood forest benefits 
(NWFBs) provides a potential alternative to direct taxpayer support.1 According to Killin and 
Brazenor (2003), ‘It is increasingly apparent that any type of commercial plantation 
expansion in north Queensland will need to combine traditional timber-only returns with 
greenhouse and biodiversity bonuses, and returns from the emerging carbon credits market, 
to achieve a sufficiently high financial rate of return for forestry (7%)’.  
 
Considerable attention has been given worldwide to the potential to create markets for the 
ecosystem services and non-marketed products provided by native forests and plantations. 
This could take the form of annual payments to growers for specific ecosystem service 
components, or it could involve the creation of some form of marketable certificate for the 
service. Landell-Mills and Porras (2002, cited in Pagiola et al. 2002) identified about 300 
examples throughout the world of experiments with market-based approaches to providing 
incentives for conserving forests and their public good benefits. Pagiola et al. (2002) 
presented case studies of some of the more advanced experiments, with a focus on three 
particular ecological services, viz. watershed protection, biodiversity conservation and carbon 
sequestration.  
 
                                                 
1 A market mechanism may be thought of as a system for rewarding the providers of ecological 
services, whereas a market-based instrument may be viewed more narrowly as the creation of a 
trading system for a particular item, e.g. a carbon or salinity credit. 
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The next section of this paper examines the rationale for creating market mechanisms to 
allow tree growers to capture a return from the public good benefits of their investments. 
Market based instruments are then placed within the context of the range of policy 
instruments available to achieve environmental objectives. The types of forest services for 
which markets normally do not exist but for which a commodity could be created are then 
discussed. Experiments and experiences with trading systems are reviewed. Opportunities 
for payments for ecosystems services of forestry (including small-scale plantations in north 
Queensland) are then examined. Concluding comments follow. 
 
THE RATIONALE FOR PAYMENTS FOR FOREST EXTERNALITIES 
Forest enterprises generate a number of benefits to the community above and beyond those 
to the tree growers, categorized in general terms as ecosystem services. Because the 
investor (farmer or company) cannot capture the value of these outputs, which are not traded 
in markets, the private return from forestry is less than the social return, and hence 
afforestation and reforestation take place at less than socially optimal levels. That is, a form 
of market failure takes place. This market failure may be particularly apparent for the long-
rotation high-value native hardwoods, cf. shorter-rotation exotic conifers. If landholders are to 
incur private costs to provide benefits for the community, then social justice would suggest 
there should be some form of compensation from the beneficiaries. It is therefore logical to 
examine how growers can be remunerated for these positive social externalities. 
 
If landholders can sell some form of ecosystem service credit for the social benefits they 
generate, then these services become a forest joint product rather than forestry externality 
(the externality is ‘internalized’), and this may make the enterprise profitable from a private 
viewpoint (Binning et al. 2002). Hence there is interest in a number of countries in 
commodification of positive externalities of forests and creation of a revenue stream for tree 
growers.  
 
Market mechanisms provide an incentive for tree planting and forest protection. Since long 
payback period is an important impediment to farm forestry, some system of annuity 
payments allowing a return to be generated soon after planting and before commercial 
timber is produced may make forestry a considerably more attractive investment. As well as 
making plantations more financially viable, annual payments for ecosystem services can 
ease cash flow problems, i.e. make forestry investments financially feasible for cash-
strapped landholders. Revenue from ecosystem services could also reduce financial 
uncertainty of plantation investments. Further, there may be an important psychological 
impact of the ecosystem credit scheme, in terms of signaling to landholders that government 
and traders in ecosystem credits support farm forestry, and that establishing plantations is an 
ethically correct action. As well, creation of ecosystem service credits could provide a feeling 
amongst non-industrial foresters of greater harvest security, as a result of a demonstrated 
financial commitment of government and industry to their enterprise. 
 
The creation of markets for ecosystem services will involve establishment, operating and 
monitoring costs (i.e. transactions costs). In this context, Brand (2002) argued that Australian 
Federal and State governments are unable to provide sufficient support for developing 
markets for ecosystem services, and that a more promising option is to mobilize private 
capital. He observed that forestry investments, which can provide a cash flow from 
environmental services as well as long-run returns from timber, can be attractive to the 
private sector. It is probable, however, that government will have to play a major role in 
facilitation of any ecosystem service marketing systems. 
 
Brand 2002 (p. 237) noted that ‘The Kyoto Protocol rules, particularly the provisions of Article 
3.3, are an important stimulus to this new financial mechanism [investing in carbon 
sequestration]. Article 3.3 requires national governments in industrialized Annex 1 countries 
to account for afforestation, reforestation, and deforestation events occurring since 1990. 
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The Bonn agreement in 2001 confirmed that projects eligible for credits against agreed 
national CO2 emission targets would include those where a land use change from non-forest 
to forest had occurred’. He further noted that the accounting methodology adopted is the 
stock change approach, where forests that are growing are treated as a carbon sink and 
harvesting is treated as re-emission to the atmosphere. 
 
Companies in some of the industries associated with environmental pollution are likely to 
show interest in purchase of credits for environmental services, e.g. fuel and energy 
companies such as Shell and BP Amoco with respect to carbon sequestration (van Bueren 
2001). This may arise because the companies have emission caps placed on them by 
national governments, or may wish to gain experience in trading before any formal 
requirement is imposed upon them, or choose to invest in environmental credits to 
demonstrate good environmental citizenship. Should the Kyoto Protocol be ratified 
internationally, then mandatory constraints can be expected on net carbon emissions, and 
since vegetation sinks are recognized in this regard, industry will be required to reduce their 
emissions or purchase emission credits.2 
 
MARKET-BASED INSTRUMENTS VERSUS OTHER POLICY OPTIONS 
FOR ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION 
In practice, a variety of environmental policy measures or instruments have been applied by 
government at its various levels to overcome environmental problems, or bring about a 
‘socially efficient level of emissions’. Figure 1 provides a summary of the more common of 
these methods. Some of these methods use the authority of the government to command 
that polluters limit their emissions (command-and-control or CAC methods). Some facilitate 
operation of a market for abatement (market-based instruments, MBI), while some rely on 
development of improved technology to mitigate emissions or to repair damages. As well, 
governments can undertake direct action for environmental protection, at taxpayer expense. 
These policies may be compared on the basis of a number of criteria, including: efficiency 
and cost-effectiveness; fairness (equity); environmental justice; incentives for long-run 
improvement; information requirement, implementation cost and enforceability; and moral 
considerations. 
 
In general, environmental economists advocate market-based instruments (MBIs) as 
alternatives to standards and CAC measures, which are unpopular with industry and lead to 
avoidance and high enforcement costs. The creation of marketable certificates creates 
private sector incentives for environmental protection, and allows those who can generate 
the benefits at lowest cost to do so, and those who would not be cost-effective in generating 
the service to purchase certificates from others (Field and Field 2002). Hence the service 
tends to be produced at lowest overall (economic) cost in a free and well-defined market. 
 
Forestry is typically assisted by the MBI of abatement subsidies, and by direct government 
expenditure on plantations and conservation plantings. Traditionally, non-industrial forestry 
has been encouraged through various forms of subsidies and grants for tree planting. 
However, this imposes an obvious cost on the taxpayer and, further, subsidies appear not 
particularly effective for promoting tree growing unless they are set at a high level, and they 
are currently out of favour with Australian governments. Commoditisation of ecosystem 
services and trading of some form of transferable permit such as a carbon credit is an 
alternative to taxpayer-funded subsidies. 
                                                 
2 Sinks are included in national allocation plans but at the time of writing it was still to be decided 
whether forestry sinks will be fully incorporated into the flexible mechanisms of the Kyoto - Joint 
Implementation, the Clean Development Mechanism, and emissions trading; for example, forestry 
sinks are currently excluded from the EU Emissions Trading Scheme. This may be resolved at the 
ninth session of the Conference of the Parties (CoP 9) of the United Nations Framework Convention 
on Climate Change. 
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3 Sometimes harvesting is permitted only on condition of prompt replanting. 
4 Of course, the forestry support arrangements in the UK and Germany may no
Australia. Both countries have much higher populations and high industrialization,
urban people interface more with rural areas than in Australia. 
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carbon credits, the cost would be borne by electricity consumers. In other words, the 
members of society meeting the cost of the ecosystem service are not radically different to 
taxpayers in general.  
 
An argument against subsidies and grants is that they create a ‘dole-out mentality’ and that 
landholders do not value plantations for which they have incurred little personal expense. In 
contrast, transferable credits allow landholders to earn revenue from their own endeavours. 
That is, the psychological impact of a market for ecosystem services could be important. As 
well, there might be greater certainty of the long-term continuation of the market, cf. the 
notoriously short life of most government forestry support programs in Australia. Further, 
transferable credits may be more efficient in terms of linking payments to the value of 
environmental benefits, cf. the often political targeting of forestry subsidy programs.  
 
EXPERIMENTAL TRADING SYSTEMS FOR FOREST ECOLOGICAL 
SERVICES 
The commodification of ecosystem services requires establishment of some form of product 
and market mechanism. According to Pagiola et al. (2002, p. ix-x), ‘The sale of ecosystem 
services is a complex undertaking with a tremendous variety of market structures, payment 
schemes, and numbers and types of participants … Issues of property rights, pricing, and 
interaction between services, not to mention services that have yet to be described, remain 
problematic. The innovations in this area are still limited in scale, scope, and impact, and 
trading in environmental services remains a nascent activity’. Nevertheless, a number of 
promising examples can be found of trading in ecosystem services from forests, some of 
which are now briefly reviewed.  
 
Trading Carbon Sequestered by Plantations 
It is to be expected that emission trading schemes will develop in the future (for carbon and 
other greenhouse gases), and these may include forestry carbon sinks. Estimating the 
carbon sequestration value from plantations is a complex accounting issue. Questions arise 
as to whether to use carbon stock or flow estimates for accounting, and whether to include 
carbon in all parts of the tree (including canopy and roots) as well as soil carbon. It is 
desirable that net carbon sequestration be estimated, taking account of the previous land use 
and of the carbon costs of establishing and managing plantations, timber harvesting, 
transport and processing, and carbon leakage arising from milling and product decay 
(especially for short-life items such as newspapers). The analyses may also extend to the 
reduction in greenhouse gases from not producing the products which timber displaces. 
 
Pioneering work on development of a system for trading sequestered carbon from 
plantations was undertaken in New South Wales. In 1999, State Forests of New South Wales 
(SFNSW) and the Sydney Futures Exchange signed a Memorandum of Understanding to 
jointly develop a market for trading of sequestered carbon, which was compatible with Article 
3.3 of the Kyoto Protocol (Lamb 2000a). Under the Carbon Rights Legislation Amendment 
Act 1998 (NSW), carbon sequestration is recognized as a right (a profit á prende), and there 
is separate ownership and trading entitlements to land, trees and carbon rights. A Carbon 
Accounting Standard was proposed to provide a standardized, transparent and defendable 
carbon product.5 It was envisaged that pools would be formed of growers who achieved 
accreditation in their carbon management system (including SFNSW). The proposal included 
full and partial accreditation depending on accreditation competence, with the latter having 
                                                 
5 The National Carbon Accounting System was established in 1999, and first reported in 2002. 
Australia’s land-use change emissions have now been estimated for the period 1988-2001 (AGO 
2003). 
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lower accreditation costs and allowing trade of 70% or 50% of the net tradeable mass of 
carbon.6 
 
The Sydney Futures Exchange trading in carbon credits was proposed to commence in 
2000, but failed to proceed. In this context, SFNSW was ahead of its time. According to 
Brand (2002, p. 242), ‘At this point there is no officially sanctioned registry of carbon stocks 
anywhere in the world’. However, Brand (2002) noted that the NSW government in 2002 
introduced a penalty of $A10-20/tonne for excess CO2 emissions, and indicated that carbon 
sequestration credits could be used as offsets to this commitment, as well as releasing a 
detailed position paper on carbon credit accounting, registry and trading systems. 
 
A drawback of the carbon credit trading proposal, identified by Lamb (2000a,b), is that the 
compliance requirements would be too expensive for individual small growers, a minimum 
forest area to support the transactions costs being of the order of 1000 ha. This might be 
overcome to some extent by a pooling process, with the carbon pool managed by a large 
firm, private consultant, industry association or grower cooperative, and sharing of the 
carbon credits amongst the pool. One example might be the joint venture plantings, such as 
those undertaken by government or by timber companies and landholders  
 
Another Australian initiative for trading sequestered carbon is the Hancock Natural Resource 
Group’s New Forest Program. This is designed to ‘establish investment products that will 
assemble a portfolio of different forests with varying profiles of carbon sequestration, land 
and water rehabilitation benefits, timber production, and other returns’ (Brand 2002, p. 237).  
 
The above proposals place high priority on accountability. However, they are perhaps too 
complex for many situations, including application to smallholder forestry in developing 
countries. In contrast, Pagiola et al. (2002) envisaged a somewhat simpler carbon trading 
system, which would be workable in developing countries. 
 
Marketing of Watershed Protection Values 
Pagiola (2002) reviewed a formal, countrywide system of environmental service payments for 
water services of forests in Costa Rica. These services include reduction in sediment loads, 
regulating the timing of water flows, increasing flows (particularly in dry seasons), and 
improving water quality. It is noted that the services typically are enjoyed by people some 
distance from the forest that generate them, and land users in or near the forest typically do 
not receive any compensation for providing the services. In this initiative, payments were 
made to watershed land users by electricity companies at a rate of US$42/ha/year for 
reforestation and forest management activities. In the event, only 24,000 ha out of a target 
area of 200,000 ha was specifically financed from water services between 1997 and 2002. 
 
Marketing of Salinity Mitigation Credits from Forestry 
Reforestation is recognized to have high potential for amelioration of dryland salinity. Salinity 
credit trading has taken place in the Murray-Darling Basin in Australia, but this appears to 
have been between governments, and not as compensation to landholders for reforestation 
in the catchment. No case studies of trading in salinity credits are provided in the collection of 
papers by Pagiola et al. (2002). 
 
Bioprospecting 
Laird and Kate (2002) examined prospects for pharmaceutical biodiversity prospecting, 
pointing out cynically that this was a poorly understood area except for the recognition that 
‘many drugs have natural origins, and many sell very well’ (p. 151). They concluded that 
biodiversity prospecting has the potential to provide considerable funding and non-monetary 
                                                 
6 This has now been superseded by the rules governing the Kyoto Protocol, which will require 
compliance with the Marrakesh Accords and provisions arising from CoP 9. 
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support for forest conservation. However, it is probable that this finding would not carry over 
to plantation forests. 
 
Payments for Allowing Public Recreation in Woodlots 
A further mechanism for generating a cash flow for farm foresters is for government to 
provide payments for the provision of recreation services. For example, in the United 
Kingdom, farmers with existing natural stands of forest located near major urban areas are 
entitled to a Woodland Improvement Grant for works which will encourage informal public 
recreation in existing woodlands, such as construction of car parks, seating in picnic areas, 
construction of walking paths and signage, thinning to make views more pleasant, and 
making the wood safer for the public (Forestry Commission 1995). Smith (1994) commented 
on the role of managed landscapes of the UK and the financial compensation to landholders 
to provide recreation facilities such as camping sites, on their land. Similar arrangements 
have been provided in The Netherlands where woodland owners who allow public access 
are compensated for expenditure on items such as footpath maintenance and litter collection 
(Hummel 1991). It is questionable whether Australian governments would be prepared to 
make payments for recreation services of private forests, given the large areas gazetted as 
National Parks and the lack of culture of public access to private land. 
 
Use of Thinnings and Harvest Residue as Biofuel 
Fuelwood is an important product from forests in developing countries, and plantation timber 
is burnt for energy generation in some European countries, though biofuel use is limited in 
Australia. In a sense, this is a type of environmental service of forestry, in that fuelwood 
provides a sustainable primary energy source to displace some fossil fuel use. A promising 
application is in small-scale electricity generation. Biofuel energy generation is widely 
adopted in Europe; for example much of the plantation-grown timber in Denmark, along with 
cereal stubble, is used for urban heating networks. Biofuel electricity generation requires a 
relatively large and continuous wood supply, and considerable capital outlay is involved in 
setting up the generation plant and linking to transmission lines. Also, in Australia 
environmental groups oppose this energy source fearing the fuelwood will be extracted from 
native forests. More impetus could be given to use of biofuel if there is a substantial increase 
in the Australian government’s mandatory renewable energy target (MRET). 
 
Some Observations from Experimental Applications 
A number of observations may be drawn from the examples of trading systems reviewed 
above. 
 
• Trading in forest ecosystem services is still in its infancy.  
• Major administrative issues have to be overcome. As noted by Brand (2002, p. 244), a 
key impediment to commercialization of environmental services is the lack of 
definition, accreditation and registration of these goods and services. 
• Clear evidence of demand is necessary to set up markets, which should be 
recognized as demand driven rather than supply driven. 
• Transaction costs can be high, including setup, assessment, validation and monitoring 
costs. 
• The revenue generated from trading may be sufficient to make a difference in terms of 
plantation viability. Two Australian examples of potential values and prices of 
ecosystem services may be cited. Brand (2002) reported that financial modeling by 
Hancock Natural Resources Group (HNRG) indicates an increase in after-tax rate of 
return on forestry investments from 10.6% to 12% from inclusion of carbon credits, 
based on a price of US$5 per tonne of CO2 equivalent. Wilson Land Management 
Services and Ivey ATP Agricultural Consulting and Management Services (2002, cited 
by Venn in press) estimated that the net present value (NPV) of off-site salinity costs 
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avoided by establishing 6,310 ha of plantations within the catchment was $427/ha at a 
discount rate of 8%.  
• Managing forests for joint products can lead to differences in silviculture. It may be 
necessary to extend the harvest age, and take other measures to achieve joint 
products at some sacrifice to wood production. 
• Future prospects are promising, particularly for trading in carbon credits. Brand (2002, 
p. 244) noted that ‘There is widespread optimism that carbon sequestration may be 
the first of these international environmental commodities…’. Once these markets are 
functioning and the price signals and forward price curves are established, we will see 
institutional capital take a lead role in providing services such as carbon sequestration, 
watershed management, and biodiversity enhancement.’ 
 
POTENTIAL FOR MARKETING NON-WOOD FOREST/PLANTATION 
VALUES IN NORTH QUEENSLAND 
There are a number of products and services of plantation forestry in north Queensland 
which potentially could be made into commodities, such that growers could receive a return 
from them. These include: 
 
• carbon sequestration; 
• watershed protection (protection of water quality, soil erosion control, sediment 
control, flood mitigation, maintenance of dry-season flows, protection of marine 
habitat) ; 
• salinity mitigation (watertable management) ; 
• biodiversity conservation or enhancement; 
• bioprospecting;  
• forest recreation (landscape amenity, access roads, walking tracks, seating) ; 
• wildlife habitat; and 
• biofuel production (especially from thin-to-waste timber and harvest residues). 
 
The values of these services and products will vary with the type of forest, type of potential 
purchaser, community attitudes and government policy. Plantations produce carbon, and add 
to watershed protection and salinity mitigation, while native forests have greater biodiversity 
conservation and bioprospecting values. 
 
The impetus for trading in carbon credits arises from international factors – e.g. concern over 
global warming – and consequent international accords such as the Kyoto Protocol and its 
flexible mechanisms. In the case of other environmental services, the externalities are mainly 
confined to the local region, hence there is less international pressure for control 
mechanisms and less impetus to develop trading systems. However, there is perhaps 
stronger justification for domestic beneficiaries to compensate landholders for providing the 
services. 
 
Tradable Credits from Carbon Sequestration 
In Queensland, the large firms which generate greenhouse gases are likely to be the ones 
interested in purchasing greenhouse gas credits, and having cash flows sufficiently high to 
be able to do so. These include electricity generators (since most generation is by coal-fired 
plants) and fuel companies (since motor vehicle emissions contribute to CO2 and other 
undesirable emissions). A system of renewable energy certificates (RECs) is now operating 
in Australia. In the case of local positive off-site impacts, such as watershed protection, the 
benefits are felt at a local government level (e.g. local government manage domestic water 
supplies), but often local government would have difficulty funding payments for ecosystem 
services. 
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It is probable that in the case of farmers in north Queensland, with only a small area of forest, 
the cost associated with a system of tradeable carbon credits would outweigh the benefits. 
Harrison et al. (2003) noted that in a sample of 72 participants in the Community Rainforest 
Reforestation Program, 34% had planted less than 3 ha, and 24% between 3 and 10 ha, the 
median area being 3.5 ha and the maximum 45 ha.  New large industrial growers, such as 
the companies planting eucalypts in south-east and central Queensland, may have 
plantations of sufficient scale to enable trading in carbon credits.7 It may be that grower 
associations (such as the North Queensland Timber Co-operative) or brokers could 
aggregate the contributions of small-scale growers in some form of group accreditation so as 
to make trading feasible.  
 
The most notable effort towards placing real dollars on ecosystem services of forestry in 
north Queensland has been the Greenhouse Gap Abatement Program (GGAP) initiative, 
arranged by the Douglas Shire Council and Mossman Central sugar mill. The Australian 
Greenhouse Office agreed to funding of $1.7M to facilitate the planting of about 3000 ha of 
forests, along with other energy projects. It was considered likely that one of the large fuel 
companies would be prepared to purchase the carbon credits from this program. The GGAP 
project offered the prospect of payments for carbon sequestration, although the federal 
government funding was mainly designed for operational activities (or ‘making it happen’) 
and it is probable that the carbon credits would have gone proportionally to the Federal 
governments and the private sector investment companies, who may have then passed on 
some of the payments to individual tree growers. More fundamentally, it is difficult to 
envisage how such an area of plantations could be established, compatible with the 
preference in the region for native species, when the highly generous Community Rainforest 
Reforestation Program achieved a planted area of only about 2000 ha over six years.  
Depressed sugar prices and the relatively small catchment area have resulted in financial 
difficulties for the Mossman Central sugar mill, and the GGAP initiative (which includes an 
ethanol plant at the mill) may not proceed. 
 
Watershed Protection and Related Benefits 
Given the high levels and intensity of precipitation, watershed protection is of high priority in 
north Queensland. Establishing plantations on degraded farm land would contribute to 
erosion control. Prevention of transport of sediment and agrochemicals to the Great Barrier 
Reef would be a further benefit. Development of a system of marketing watershed protection 
credits would be difficult; presumably, local governments would need to promote this policy. 
It may be that governments would opt for a system of standards or best management 
practice (BMP) rather than tradable permits.  
 
Water Quality Protection 
Drinking water quality does not appear to be an issue in north Queensland, with the relatively 
low population and water storages located within the protected rainforest area. Of greater 
concern is water quantity, exemplified by recent shortages of town water on the southern 
Atherton Tableland, although forestry has limited ability to increase water yield. 
 
Salinity Mitigation 
Dryland and irrigation land salinity does not appear to be a pressing problem, in part due to 
the very high rainfall and the soil types in much of north Queensland, although it may 
become an issue around the Burdekin Dam. 
 
                                                 
7 Most of the DPI-Forestry plantations are not Kyoto compliant because they were established before 
the baseline year of 1990; only post-1990 plantations established on previously cleared land are 
acceptable.   
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Biodiversity Protection and Bioprospecting 
Research is being devoted to bioprospecting in north Queensland, but from natural forests, 
not plantations. 
 
Wildlife Habitat 
Surveys of landholders indicate that plantations do provide habitat for macrofauna (mainly 
lizards and birds), although the habitat contribution is small in relation to the World Heritage 
rainforests, and it is unlikely that any support for tradeable permits would be provided for this 
reason. 
 
Forest Recreation 
It is unlikely in the present political climate that payments would be made for landscape 
amenity benefits of farm forestry. High landscape amenity is provided in the region by the 
large area of protected rainforests, including nearly one million hectares in the Wet Tropics of 
Queensland World Heritage Area. 
 
Biofuel Production 
Currently in north Queensland, logging residue is burnt on site or left on site. An opportunity 
exists for electricity generation utilizing biofuel from thin-to-waste and harvest residues, for 
which technology is currently available. However, the likely low market value would not have 
a strong incentive effect, though this situation could change with an increase in the MRET 
target. Opportunity exists for linking bioenergy generation with the current cogeneration of 
sugar mills. 
 
Negative Externalities of Plantation Forestry in North Queensland 
It is notable that farm forestry in north Queensland also generates some negative 
externalities, such as provision of habitat for feral animal pests and native pest species which 
cause crop damage. These problems are dealt with by standards (e.g. a requirement to 
control feral pigs) and cull quotas (e.g. for cockatoos). Both species could be turned into 
resources for hunting and domestic or export sale, although this does not seem compatible 
with current government environmental culture.8 
 
CONCLUDING COMMENTS 
Traditionally, farm forestry has been supported by subsidies and grants. Transferable credits 
are an alternative market-based instrument, which converts the ecosystem services of 
forests into a market commodity. The marketing of forest ecosystem services and other 
products and services has potential to improve the financial viability of small-scale timber 
plantations, and hence encourage accelerated planting and generate substantial public good 
benefits. To date, such commoditisation has been largely experimental throughout the world, 
though viable models have been devised. In north Queensland, opportunities exist for 
marketing forest ecosystem services (particularly carbon credits) and for creating markets for 
plantation waste. It can be expected that these markets will develop in the future, providing 
the institutional framework is supportive. Should market mechanisms become available for 
what are currently externalities, farm forestry will have less of an image of a non-viable 
enterprise, and more investment funds are likely to become available, although lack of 
economies of size may be a limiting factor. 
 
The political climate for greenhouse gas emission reduction through plantation forestry is 
strong in Australia, which has argued for vegetation carbon sinks during international 
negotiations. On the other hand, limited support can be expected for marketing of other 
ecosystem services of farm forestry. In Europe, access to the countryside tends to be 
regarded as a birthright of the urban population. In contrast, some countries including 
                                                 
8 Substantial ‘wild boar’ export takes place from Australia, but little from the Queensland Wet Tropics. 
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Australia have a stronger exclusion attitude to farm land, supported by trespass laws, and 
concerns over bushfire risk. Whereas pioneering work on trading of credits for carbon 
sequestration has been carried out in Australia, progress is likely to be slow on developing 
tradable permits for other plantation ecosystem services. 
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